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IS HOBBY LOBBY A TOOL FOR LIMITING 
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS? 
Jennifer S. Taub∗ 
Critics lament that with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.,1 the Supreme Court further expanded corporate personhood 
powers. This Article offers an alternative reading. It suggests that 
Hobby Lobby might actually provide a tool for limiting previously 
recognized corporate constitutional rights. To those who oppose 
the decision, this assertion might seem unduly optimistic. After 
all, the Court did determine that three family-owned business 
corporations were “persons” with sincere religious beliefs entitled 
to use the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)2 to 
deprive employees of federally mandated healthcare insurance 
coverage. Given that the Court determined that certain “closely 
held”3 business corporations possessed statutory rights previously 
thought reserved to real human beings, it would not seem to 
presage the future restriction of corporate constitutional rights. 
However, by designating (thus far) just closely-held corporations 
as persons with free-exercise rights under RFRA the Court invites 
us to question whether other corporations (that lack similar 
attributes) would be denied such personhood. And, if so, whether 
a distinction between closely-held corporations and others could 
be applied to curtail corporate constitutional rights. 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I would like to thank John Coates for 
the invitation to the November 7, 2014, “Advancing a New Jurisprudence for American 
Self-Governance” symposium co-sponsored by Harvard Law School and Free Speech for 
People, as well as the other organizers, panelists, and participants. I am also grateful for 
comments and suggestions from Caroline Corbin, Ron Fein, Michelle Harner, Heidi 
Kitrosser, Tamara Piety, Elizabeth Pollman, and Jasper Tran, and to Jill Hasday and Tom 
Boyle for coordinating this Constitutional Commentary symposium issue. I would also like 
to thank the members of the University of Illinois School of Law community who provided 
feedback during a faculty workshop on March 10, 2015, and organizers, panelists, and 
participants at the University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law symposium 
on “The Impact of the First Amendment on American Business,” held on March 27, 2015. 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 2. Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
 3. 134 S. Ct. at 2769. 
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Determining how Hobby Lobby restricts corporate 
personhood rights is not a mere thought experiment. It has 
become immediately necessary as a practical matter. Because the 
Court held that the contraceptive mandate4 under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)5 as applied to the 
three corporate litigants violated RFRA, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) was obligated to fashion an 
exemption for them and similar organizations. Yet, 
notwithstanding the apparent importance of the term to its central 
holding, the Court majority failed to define what it meant by a 
“closely-held corporation.”6 Moreover, there is no uniform state7 
or federal law defining this now critical category. Further, the 
decision seemed to discourage “discriminating” between classes 
of corporate entities.8 Wrestling with this apparent indefiniteness, 
HHS sought through a proposed rulemaking to create a 
diagnostic test (what I will refer to as a type of “Hobby Lobby 
Tool”) to identify the circumstances when business corporations 
could become eligible for the exemption from the contraceptive 
mandate. 
 
 4. See infra Section I. 
 5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 42 U.S.C. § 18001. 
 6. Anne Tucker, No Clear Lines in the Sand, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (June 30, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/06/no-clear-lines-in-the-sand.html; 
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (forthcoming 2015) (on file with the author) (“although 
the Court extensively relied on the ‘closely held’ terminology in seemingly cabining its 
holding, the Court never defined this term for its purposes and no singular definition exists 
in corporate law to clearly limit the scope of Hobby Lobby’s reach”). 
 7. Approximately twenty states and also the District of Columbia have statutes that 
provide for the “close corporation” form. 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CORP. 
FORMS ANN. § 6:22 (5th ed. 2015). In those states that do not have statutory close 
corporations, business corporations can often structure themselves to be a “close 
corporation,” however, what that entails can vary from state to state. See F. HODGE 
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 CLOSE CORP. AND LLCS: LAW AND PRAC. § 1:19 
(3d ed. 2014); see also Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 6 (while there is no 
“singular definition . . . [i]t is typically understood to refer to a corporation with a small 
number of shareholders whose shares are not readily transferable and who are often 
involved in managing the corporation”). 
 8. The Court suggests that no distinction should be made between one type of 
corporation and another. “No known understanding of the term ‘person’ includes some 
but not all corporations. The term ‘person’ sometimes encompasses artificial persons (as 
the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no 
conceivable definition of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but 
not for-profit corporations.” (134 S. Ct. at 2769). In addition, the majority did not close the 
door to publicly traded corporations claiming to be persons for purposes of RFRA. 
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The Hobby Lobby majority opinion does provide some 
guidance.9 The Court’s threshold determination that the three 
corporations were persons under RFRA appears to have 
depended upon the existence of three conditions. First, upon 
looking through the corporate entity,10 the Court was able to see 
human owners that were co-extensive with the corporation. This 
move ignored the “separateness” that state corporate law 
recognizes between a corporation and its owners.11 Second, it 
appears that only because the identified human owners held (or 
agreed to share) the same sincere religious beliefs, and third, 
openly ran the corporation in accordance with those beliefs, did 
the Court conclude the beliefs of these human beings could be 
attributed to the corporate entity.12 Arguably, only with these 
three factors present, did the Court determine that the 
contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the sincere 
religious beliefs of each corporation. The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Samuel Alito, suggests that to be deemed a 
person under RFRA, a corporation would not need to be closely 
held. Thus, so long as each of these three conditions was met a 
corporation could be considered a person under RFRA. 
Conversely, not all closely held corporations could meet the test.13 
 
 9. Many corporate law scholars have studied the opinion seeking guidance to 
distinguish between those business corporations that could or should have free exercise 
rights. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, Minnesota Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 14-39, at 1, 6 (Oct. 22, 2014) (After contending that “Where 
religious beliefs shape a corporation’s purposes, the protections of RFRA may rightly 
apply,” the author suggests a framework. “The framework considers two dimensions: 
organization and ownership. Along each dimension, a corporation can vary from no to 
high religious commitment. Ownership looks to the number and concentration of 
shareholders and the degree to which they share strongly held religious beliefs.”), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513380 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2513380. 
 10. The Court also looked through trusts for Mardel and Hobby Lobby to see the 
owners. 
 11. The Court has previously recognized the separateness of the corporation and its 
owners. See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) 
(Justice Breyer for the majority wrote: “the employee and the corporation are different 
‘persons,’ even where the employee is the corporation’s sole owner. After all, 
incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, 
obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who 
created it, who own it, or whom it employs”); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 
(1998) (corporate parent entity separate from subsidiary). 
 12. Cf. Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 
70 BUS. LAWYER 1, 16–17 (2015) (“The Court thus upheld the institutional heft of the 
corporation as a distinct person under RFRA, and did not simply disregard it making it 
indistinguishable from its human participants.”). 
 13. Cf. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 184 (2014) 
(“Despite the fears that were voiced on this issue during the litigation, the Court did not 
do for the Free Exercise Clause what Citizens United did for the Speech Clause, although 
nothing in the majority’s opinion suggests that it would not do so in the proper case . . . 
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Evidence of the first condition can be found in Justice Alito’s 
explanation that rights arising from the designation of a 
corporation as a fictional person were designed to protect the 
rights of real human beings associated with the entity. Depending 
upon the nature of the statutory or constitutional right, his 
opinion acknowledged that some, but not all, such rights derived 
from looking through the entity14 to the owners to find such 
human beings deserving of protection. For other rights, he 
indicated that the Court might look around to protect a wider 
group of stakeholders.15 Justice Alito noted that corporate free 
exercise rights were designed to protect “the religious liberty of 
the humans who own and control those companies.”16 Given this 
framework, it seems that looking through to the owners17 to find 
an identity of interest with the corporate entity is a necessary, but 
insufficient condition. Further evidence from the opinion also 
suggests that the aforementioned second and third conditions—
that the owners shared the same, or agreed to share the same 
 
despite the possible ramifications of the opinion, the Court does not extend its holding 
beyond closely held corporations”). 
 14. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, IOWA L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“When the Court ascribes to corporations a right otherwise 
attributable to natural persons, it typically invokes a version of the ‘aggregate’ theory as 
justification.”). 
 15. Note that corporate law scholars are accustomed to inconsistency in how the 
Court sees corporate identity. See Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: 
Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 883 (2012) (“[T]he argument 
made here is not for convergence in perspectives on corporate groups across all areas of 
law. Rather, it is that in different areas of law, theories of the corporation, and, by 
extension, of corporate groups can be used to evaluate or legitimate particular legal 
rules”); Buccola, supra note 14, at 3–4 (“Over the course of two hundred years, the Court 
has articulated inconsistent and mutually incompatible theories of the corporation, 
theories which seem to yield predictably unpredictable judgments about the existence of a 
corporate right . . . Apparently incompatible conceptions of the firm might feature, without 
comment, in a single opinion. In Hale v. Henkel, for example, the Court held that 
corporations may not invoke the fifth-amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but 
also that they may rely on the fourth amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of 
Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First 
National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979) (The Court lacks “any expressly 
enunciated common rationale [in cases concerning corporate rights]. Many cases appear 
to involve an ad hoc determination rather than the development or application of a general 
principle”); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate 
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“the Court has not 
carefully analyzed its legal theory of corporate rights, nor has it expressly articulated a 
framework for thinking about corporations that could guide its decision making in a 
consistent way”). 
 16.  134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 17. Note that Justice Alito alludes to the improbability of institutional owners 
meeting the second condition (agreement to run the corporation under the same religious 
beliefs), thus indicating that perhaps exclusively human owners is not necessary. 
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religious beliefs, and agreed to run the corporation openly 
according to those beliefs—would also need to be present in order 
to treat a corporation as a person under RFRA.18 
Based upon this understanding of Hobby Lobby, this Article 
contemplates whether the three putative preconditions to finding 
corporate statutory free exercise rights could be adapted for a 
constitutional rights context. Given that the Court has not yet 
found that corporations have free exercise rights under the First 
Amendment, we would need to look for another illustration. A 
suitable example would be a Supreme Court decision in which 
corporate constitutional rights were recognized based upon 
looking through the entity to the owners. The reasoning in such 
an opinion should be reexamined to determine whether the Court 
did, should have, or might in the future apply a Hobby Lobby 
Tool. In other words, we could inquire whether recognition of the 
look through right should depend upon the existence of the 
second and third conditions (relating to consent, control, and 
public notice). If so, then that corporate personhood right might 
also be limited to entities with identifiable human owners that 
share (or agree to share) the same perspectives related to the 
exercise of that right and to openly disclose those views. 
An ideal case to revisit—that recognized a look-through-to-
owners-derived constitutional right—is Citizens United v. FEC.19 
In Citizens, the Court greatly expanded corporations’ rights to 
engage in political spending20 when it struck down provisions of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act21 (“BCRA”) that were 
designed to limit corporate influence on federal elections. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy reasoned that corporations were associations 
of individuals,22 and therefore those individual human beings 
should not lose their constitutional rights simply because they 
joined together as owners to form a corporation. Perhaps, the 
Hobby Lobby decision (which came down four years later) 
marked a shift in the Court’s reasoning concerning conditions 
necessary for corporations to gain look-through derived 
 
 18. Evidence can be found where Justice Alito notes that an agreement among 
shareholders “to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs” would be necessary 
should a non-closely held corporation seek the same protection under RFRA. 
 19. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 20. See id. at 886 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990), which held “that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate 
identity”). 
 21. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 22. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904, 907–08; see also id. at 925, 928–29 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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personhood rights. If so, a future federal or state law limiting 
corporate political spending to those entities that meet conditions 
similar to the three from Hobby Lobby might be upheld. 
Successful use of a Hobby Lobby Tool to craft new campaign 
finance laws might allow citizens through our representative 
government to once again place meaningful limits on the power 
of large publicly held business corporations to influence elections.  
Toward examining whether Hobby Lobby could be used to 
restrict corporate political spending rights, this Article will cover 
the following territory. First, it will review the Hobby Lobby 
decision. Next, it will show how we can identify the three 
conditions that were instrumental in the majority’s finding that 
business corporations could exercise religion as persons under 
RFRA. The Article will also examine the proposed post-Hobby 
Lobby rulemaking by HHS. In particular, it will review three 
comment letters submitted by separate groups of law professors 
that recommend how HHS could decide when business 
corporations should (and should not) be treated as persons 
entitled to the exemption from the contraceptive mandate.23 
Thirdly, this piece will revisit Citizens United to apply a 
Hobby Lobby Tool by proposing the conditions that should be 
present for a corporation’s political spending to be protected 
under the First Amendment. This could include (1) look through 
to identify human owners; (2) notice and consent24 of the owners 
to engage in particular political spending; and (3) public 
disclosure of the spending. A new statute that made such elements 
preconditions to engaging in corporate political spending or in 
receiving an exemption from a general prohibition on corporate 
political spending could be upheld. In addition to aligning with 
Hobby Lobby, such a law could be viewed as acceptable under 
Citizens United. The preconditions could be seen as appropriate 
“procedures of corporate democracy” that the Court in Citizens 
 
 23. See Letter from Law Professors to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
Department of Health and Human Services on Comment on the Definition of “Eligible 
Organization” for Purposes of Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act [File Code CMS-9940-P] (Oct. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Law Professors’ 
Comment Letter on Definition], available at https://web.law.columbia.edu
/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/prpcp_comments_on_proposed_regs_corp
_law_profs_for_submission.pdf. 
 24.  As discussed herein, such consent might be on a majority, supermajority, or 
unanimous basis. 
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sanctioned, designed to mitigate the agency problem that arises 
from the separation of ownership from control.25 
Finally, this Article will identify problems that would stem 
from reliance on a Hobby Lobby Tool to curtail corporate 
constitutional rights. To begin, it leaves in tact the questionable 
conclusion from Hobby Lobby that a business corporation is a 
person with sincere religious beliefs with statutory (and potential 
constitutional) free exercise rights. In addition, the described 
analysis would not apply to those corporate constitutional rights 
that are not dependent upon look through. Also, treating 
shareholders as “owners” and conflating owners with the 
corporation is contestable as a legal and policy matter.26 We 
should be concerned that the First Amendment could be used to 
undermine or evade regulation27 and to intrude upon workers’ 
autonomy and freedom.28 Such actions impacting the public 
should not be acceptable simply because of shareholder consent. 
Thus, cutting back to a slight degree corporate political spending 
would not address broader and more pernicious problems.29 
Moreover, this approach concedes too much ground, given the 
relatively recent recognition by the Supreme Court of corporate 
First Amendment rights.30 Further, there are more direct critiques 
 
 25. The majority also noted that there was “little evidence of abuse that cannot be 
corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’” Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 26. LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 47 (2012). 
 27. See Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 361 
(2015). 
 28. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate 
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2015) (“In 
holding that an employer’s religious objection can override the essential rights of its 
employees, the decision represents a judicial revival of corporate paternalism, potentially 
subjecting millions of American workers to restrictions that had seemingly been eliminated 
long ago by our elected representatives.”). 
 29. John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, 
and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 269 (2015) (“The corporate takeover of the 
First Amendment is at its heart the use by elite members of society of specific legal tools 
to degrade the rule of law.”). 
 30. Id. at 229, 240 (“[N]one of the corporations in existence at the time the First 
Amendment was adopted was legally authorized to engage in speech as a business activity, 
particularly political speech. Newspapers—which if organized as corporations would have 
been so authorized—by virtue of their very purpose, were not organized as 
corporations. . . . The Supreme Court did not rely on the First Amendment to strike down 
a law of any kind until 1931—that is, 140 years after the First Amendment was adopted, 
and no federal law until 1965.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Extension of the 
individual freedom of conscience decisions to business corporations strains the rationale 
of those cases beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ 
or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.”). 
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of Citizens United31 that could be used to “overturn” the decision, 
restore campaign finance limits, and/or justify public funding of 
elections, as well as fend off growing attempts to use the 
“personhood” label to rollback regulation in the area of public 
health, welfare and safety.32 Finally, relying on a Hobby Lobby 
Tool could result in the expansion instead of the contraction of 
corporate constitutional rights. Perhaps rights previously denied 
to corporations due to being personal in nature could now be 
expanded due to look through treatment. 
I.  THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION 
The Hobby Lobby case arose from objections by three 
family-owned businesses to compliance with the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 on the grounds that 
certain provisions violated each corporation’s (and their 
respective owners’) rights under Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993. The ACA requires most employers with fifty or more 
employees to provide in their group health insurance plans 
“minimum essential coverage,” including “preventative care and 
screenings” for women. Such plans must furnish this preventative 
care without imposing upon employees any “cost-sharing 
requirements.”33 The ACA did not list the preventative care that 
must be covered, but instead empowered a division of HHS to 
identify such essential coverage. Under this authority, HHS issued 
rules requiring covered employers to provide as part of the 
“preventative care,” twenty methods of contraception, each of 
which have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(the “contraceptive mandate”). Included were two types of 
emergency contraception (sometimes referred to as “the morning 
after pill”) and two types of intrauterine devices (“IUDs”). 
Despite medical opinion to the contrary,34 many religious 
 
 31. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S 
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 9, 10 (2014). 
 32. Piety, supra note 27; Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of 
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 97–98 (2014) (“Corporate constitutional litigation is 
pervasive. . . . Those constitutional claims have little in common with each other, but just 
those examples indicate the sheer breadth and importance of corporate constitutional 
litigation.”). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2010). 
 34. Jen Gunter, The Medical Facts About Birth Control and Hobby Lobby – From 
an OB/GYN, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jul. 6, 2014) (While some religious conservatives 
define pregnancy as beginning at the moment of fertilization, the medical community 
considers implantation in the uterus as when pregnancy begins. The morning-after pills 
and IUDs work to either prevent ovulation or fertilization. Only one of the IUDs could, 
under rare circumstances, also prevent implantation). 
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conservatives asserted that each of these methods acted to end 
pregnancies instead of simply working to prevent them. 
Built into the initial regulations was a narrow exemption 
from the contraceptive mandate for churches and other religious 
orders. Later, HHS provided an accommodation for other 
religious nonprofit organizations that had religious objections to 
the mandate. The accommodation required the elimination by the 
insurance provider of the objectionable contraceptive coverage 
from the employer’s healthcare plan and also the establishment of 
a separate payment by the insurance provider. Under the 
exemption, the insurance firm was not to impose any cost sharing 
on the employer, the employee, or the healthcare plan for the 
separate coverage. Not eligible for this accommodation however, 
were for-profit corporations (“business corporations”).35 
Three business corporations, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, and 
their owners challenged the contraceptive mandate, including 
under RFRA. Enacted in response36 to the 1990 Supreme Court 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,37 RFRA provides that 
the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability.”38 There is an exception to this prohibition 
if the government “demonstrates that application of the burden 
to the person––(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”39 The law, as amended, 
broadly protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”40 While 
the term “person” is not defined in the statute, the Dictionary Act 
states that, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 
 
 35. Throughout, I will refer to these as business corporations. State law varies on 
whether a business corporation is defined as “for-profit.” See Johnson & Millon, supra 
note 12, at n.32. 
 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (“[I]n Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify 
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion”). 
 37. Id. at § 2000bb (b)(1)–(2) (RFRA, was designed to “restore the compelling 
interest test . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion 
is substantially burdened; and . . . to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious 
exercise is substantially burdened by government”). 
 38. Id. at § 2000bb-1(a). 
 39. Id. at § 2000bb-1(b). The law also provides that “[a] person whose religious 
exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim 
or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 
Id. at § 2000bb-1(c). 
 40. Id. at § 2000cc–5(7)(A). 
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unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and 
‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.”41 
The owners of the three corporations claimed to have sincere 
Christian beliefs that life begins at conception and that it would 
violate such beliefs and substantially burden their exercise of 
religion to provide employees of the corporations they owned and 
controlled with access to contraceptive methods and devices that 
they believe operated after conception. The Hahns42 and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties, the corporation they owned and 
controlled, asked the federal district court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania to enjoin application of the contraceptive 
mandate so that the corporation would not have to provide the 
four contraceptive devices.43 The district court denied their 
request for a preliminary injunction and the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the position of HHS, holding 
that a for-profit corporation could not “engage in religious 
exercise and that the Hahns in their personal capacities had no 
mandate imposed upon them.”44 The Third Circuit decision 
focused on the separateness between the corporate entity and the 
human beings associated with it, writing that: 
General business corporations do not, separate and apart from 
the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or 
employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, 
observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions 
separate and apart from the intention and direction of their 
individual actors.45 
The Greens46 and the corporations they owned and controlled, 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel, were initially denied a preliminary 
 
 41. 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 42. The Hahn family comprised parents and children who owned voting stock of 
Conestoga and controlled the board. One of the sons served as its president and CEO. 134 
S. Ct. at 2764. 
 43. Failure to comply with the contraceptive mandate would have apparently 
resulted in penalties of about $33 million per year for Conestoga. 134 S. Ct. at 2775–76. 
 44. 134 S. Ct. at 2776. Hobby Lobby apparently faced an approximately $475 million 
per year fine and Mardel about $15 million. 
 45. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir.), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 46. The Green family controlled the stock of Hobby Lobby and Mardel (both 
Oklahoma business corporations) through a family trust for which the family members 
were trustees and beneficiaries. Family members served on the board of directors and also 
as senior management of the corporations.. 134 S. Ct. at 2765 (including n.15). 
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injunction by the federal district court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
however, finding that the Greens were “persons” under RFRA 
and that they had established a likelihood of success on their 
RFRA claim. 
The cases were consolidated and the Supreme Court ruled in 
a 5-4 decision in favor of all three business corporations, 
concluding that by using the term “persons” to include 
corporations, the law protected the religious liberty of the human 
beings that own and control them. And the Court attributed to 
each corporation the religious beliefs of their respective owners.47 
While the majority decision noted that these were closely held 
corporations, it did not exclude the possibility of other firms, 
including publicly held ones from being persons under RFRA. 
Implicit in its decision was the notion that for religious identity 
purposes, human owners are coextensive with the entity itself and 
have control over its exercise of religion.  
Thus the Court did not appear to pay heed to the nearly 
century old work by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means 
concerning the separation of ownership from control in the 
modern corporation,48 nor did it expressly acknowledge that the 
largest U.S. corporations are publicly traded with more than 
seventy percent of corporate shares held by institutions, not 
human beings.49 Indeed, as described below, blurring the line 
between the corporate entity and its owners was an essential 
condition toward finding that the corporations were each persons 
for purposes of RFRA. 
The Hobby Lobby decision stirred up longstanding debates 
about the nature of corporate personhood, purpose, and power.50 
Some scholars praised the decision as affirming that business 
 
 47. Garrett, supra note 32, at 144 (“The Hobby Lobby majority suggested that 
corporations can exercise religion on behalf of their owners, or as a pass-through for the 
rights of the owners.”). 
 48. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODOERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (2d ed. 1991). 
 49. See BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, ARE INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND 
PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY 
MARKETS 9 (Oct. 2011) (citing CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 
(2010)); Jill E. Fisch, Symposium, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2010) (“[A]s of the end of 2007, institutional investors 
owned an unprecedented 76.4% of the largest 1000 corporations.”). 
 50. Corporate law scholars vary on whether they see the opinion as affirming, 
defeating, or furthering existing theories. 
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corporations were free to pursue non-profit maximizing goals,51 
whereas others condemned it for allowing businesses to use claims 
of conscience to avoid complying with the law. Numerous scholars 
wondered how Justice Alito could have brushed aside a 
foundational tenet of corporate law—that the corporation is 
separate from its owners,52 particularly given the carefully argued 
amicus curiae brief submitted by forty-four law corporate and 
criminal professors on this very topic.53 
Many critics considered the practical implications of the 
Hobby Lobby decision, worrying that it provided a pathway for 
any and all types of business corporations unilaterally to deprive 
employees of legal protections and circumvent the democratic 
process. Questions arose as to the limits of the holding. Would 
employers—as HHS and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent 
suggested—attempt to exclude from healthcare insurance 
coverage blood transfusions or vaccinations?54 Would Hobby 
Lobby’s holding reach outside the health insurance context and 
 
 51. Johnson & Millon, supra note 12, at 1 (“Rejecting the federal government’s 
position that for-profit business corporations cannot ‘exercise religion’ because their sole 
purpose is to make money, the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. construed 
state corporate law as permitting a broad array of non-monetary objectives.”); see also 134 
S. Ct. at 2771–72 (“Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not protect 
for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make money. 
This argument flies in the face of modern corporate law. ‘Each American jurisdiction today 
either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its general 
corporation act for any lawful purpose or business.” 1 J. Cox & T. Hazen, Treatise of the 
Law of Corporations §4:1, p. 224 (3d ed. 2010).”) 
 52. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby, “Unconstitutional Conditions,” and 
Corporate Law Mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014 9:07 PM), http://www. scotus
blog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobby-lobby-unconstitutional-conditions-and
-corporate-law-mistakes/ (“A distinction between shareholders and the company lies at 
the very foundation of corporate law. . . . Hobby Lobby’s presumption that shareholders 
can be seen as distinct from the company for purposes of, say, limited liability, but 
identified with the company for purposes of religious freedom changes the nature of the 
government benefit itself”). 
 53. See Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Nos. 13-354 & 13-356 (Jan. 28, 2014) (“Allowing a 
corporation, through either shareholder vote or board resolution, to take on and assert the 
religious beliefs of its shareholders in order to avoid having to comply with a generally-
applicable law with a secular purpose is fundamentally at odds with the entire concept of 
incorporation.”). Note that this author is a signatory to that brief. 
 54. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting (“Would the exemption the 
Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religious grounded objections to the use 
of certain contraceptives extend to employers’ religiously grounded objections to blood 
transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived 
from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain 
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)?”). 
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permit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity?55 
Others disappointed in the decision included members of 
faith-based organizations, including the Anti-Defamation 
League, who asserted that given our “increasingly diverse 
workplaces,” allowing “for-profit employers to impose their 
owners’ religious beliefs on employees” undermined religious 
liberty.56 Linking the case to Citizens United, some decried what 
they viewed as the Court’s further expansion of the rights of large 
business enterprises in the democratic process. While the Court 
only ruled on statutory grounds, opponents viewed the opinion as 
establishing the framework for a future ruling that business 
corporations have rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Naturally, missing from those initial reactions was a deeper 
study of the opinion. A more deliberate and perhaps optimistic 
reading suggests that by drawing a distinction for statutory 
purposes between closely-held corporations and others (that do 
not share the same unified ownership and control features), 
Hobby Lobby may have provided a tool for limiting some 
corporate constitutional rights.  
However, in coming up with such a test, we must be mindful 
that the Court did not actually define the term “closely-held 
corporation” nor did it limit its holding to just that category of 
entities. Thus a diagnostic test or “Hobby Lobby Tool” would 
need to be based upon the particular conditions and attributes 
recognized in the majority opinion. Such a task is not merely 
theoretical, but necessary now, in light of the requirement that 
HHS come up with a means for providing an exemption to the 
contraceptive mandate for certain business corporations. 
Drawing on that process, we might also arrive at test that could be 
adapted to other corporate personhood rights.  
Use of such a Hobby Lobby Tool might result in the 
reduction or non-recognition of particular rights for certain 
business corporations. Most obviously, the decision invites us to 
revisit those constitutional rights the Court has recognized based 
upon the theory that a corporation is an association of owners who 
 
 55. Elizabeth Deutsch, What Does Hobby Lobby Mean for LGBT Employment 
Discrimination?, FEMINISTING, (July 3, 2014), http://feministing.com/2014/07/03/what-
does-hobby-lobby-mean-for-lgbt-employment-discrimination/. 
 56. See, e.g., Letter from Anti-Defamation League to Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services on Comment Solicited for 
CMS-9940-P (Oct. 21, 2014) (published in the Federal Register on Aug. 27, 2014). 
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are natural persons57 and that those persons should not forfeit 
their rights simply because they choose to associate together (as 
owners) in a corporate form. This theory was articulated in 
Citizens United, but is also central to the holding in Hobby Lobby. 
II. CRAFTING A “HOBBY LOBBY TOOL” 
Using the Hobby Lobby decision to limit corporate rights is 
not an ivory-tower exercise. It is a very practical pursuit. In light 
of the decision, HHS has proposed a rule to provide an exemption 
from the contraceptive mandate for certain business corporations. 
Both this proposed rulemaking and comment letters submitted in 
response demonstrate efforts to convert the Court’s reasoning 
into a useful diagnostic test. This section will discuss three 
comment letters submitted by separate groups of law professors. 
Before doing so, however, Alito’s majority opinion will first be 
examined to identify the three conditions that were arguably 
necessary toward the determination that a business corporation 
could be a person under RFRA with the personal religious belief 
of the owners attributed to the corporation. By comparing the 
language in Hobby Lobby to the alternatives offered by the 
groups of law professors, we can arrive at what the elements 
would be for the Hobby Lobby Tool. Finally, this section will 
propose an adaptable tool that could apply to previously 
recognized corporate constitutional rights. 
A. THREE CONDITIONS 
Three conditions can be identified that appear instrumental 
in the Court’s finding that business corporations could exercise 
religion as persons under RFRA. First, the Court looked-through 
each corporate entity to identify human owners and treated those 
owners as co-extensive with the corporation. This required the 
Court to ignore the “separateness” that state corporate law 
recognizes between a corporation and its owners58 for purposes 
including shielding shareholders from personal liability for the 
entity’s debts. The decision also appears to rest upon a second 
condition. Only because the identified human owners held (or 
agree to share) the same sincere religious beliefs could those 
beliefs be attributed to the corporate entity. Finally, it seems that 
 
 57. Conversely, as discussed herein, there is the less rational possibility that those 
“purely personal” rights that the Court has denied to corporations generally would 
somehow now be granted to closely-held ones. 
 58. See Greenfield, supra note 52. 
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only because the owners had the power to and actually did openly 
operate the corporation in accordance with those beliefs, did the 
Court conclude the beliefs of the owners could be attributed to 
the corporate entity. With all three conditions present, the Court 
could determine that the contraceptive mandate substantially 
burdened the sincere religious beliefs of each corporation. 
Arguably, to be deemed a person under RFRA, a corporation 
would not need to be closely held, so long as each of these 
conditions were met. Conversely, not all closely-held corporations 
would automatically be considered persons under RFRA, as they 
would not necessarily demonstrate all three conditions. Evidence 
from the decision to support the necessity of each of these 
conditions is set out below. 
Although Justice Alito wrote in the majority opinion that the 
notion of corporate separateness was “quite beside the point,”59 
the decision to look through the corporate form to the individual 
human owners is the logical and legal foundation upon which the 
decision rests. Very clearly, the holding in Hobby Lobby depends 
upon the three business corporations being family-run and 
owned. As the opinion stated, “In holding that the HHS mandate 
is unlawful, we reject HHS’s argument that the owners of the 
companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to 
organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole 
proprietorships or general partnerships.”60 In this instance, the 
Court sees the business as co-extensive with the owners. This 
conceptualization appears throughout the decision, including in 
statements such as “Congress did not discriminate in this way 
against men and women who wish to run their businesses as for-
profit corporations in the manner required by their religious 
beliefs.”61 
Much to the dismay of many corporate law professors,62 
Justice Alito conflated the corporate entity itself with the various 
human beings associated with it. In response to the Third Circuit’s 
 
 59. 134 S. Ct. at 2768 . 
 60.  Id. at 2759. 
 61.  Id. 
 62. To other legal scholars, this was far from controversial. See Brian Leiter, 
Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-Legislature (January 
10, 2015), U. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 519 (deeming the following one 
of the three “banal” aspects of the decision: “that the free exercise of religion of a closely 
held corporation is not meaningfully distinguishable from the free exercise of religion by 
the individuals who closely own the corporation.”), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2547972 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2547972. 
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assertion that separateness matters,63 Justice Alito wrote: “All of 
this is true—but quite beside the point. Corporations, ‘separate 
and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are 
employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”64 With regard to 
free-exercise rights, however, Justice Alito narrows his scope. It is 
not employees’ religious beliefs that are attributed to the 
corporation; it is only the owners’. With these rights the Court 
looks through to the owners, and does not look around to the 
managers or employees. 
This look-through approach is apparent in a final sentence of 
a long passage explaining corporate personhood rights (whether 
statutory or constitutional) as being anchored in or deriving from 
human beings associated with the corporation. The opinion reads: 
“As we will show, Congress provided protection for people like 
the Hahns and Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It 
included corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’”65 
The opinion continues on to qualify this statement as if addressing 
a skeptical public audience. “But it is important to keep in mind 
that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human 
beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used by 
human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law 
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including 
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a 
corporation in one way or another.”66 
The Court aligns each listed right of a corporation with some 
natural person. “When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, 
are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights 
of these people.”67 For each right mentioned the Court identifies 
one or more stakeholders all of whom appear to be natural 
persons. As Justice Alito explains: 
For example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to 
corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and 
others associated with the company. Protecting corporations 
from government seizure of their property without just 
compensation protects all those who have a stake in the 
corporations’ financial well-being. And protecting the free-
exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, 
 
 63. 724 F.3d 377, 385. 
 64. 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who 
own and control those companies.68 
The last sentence in the above paragraph demonstrates that 
in the Court’s view, free-exercise rights of corporations protect 
the owners as opposed to the employees or other human 
stakeholders. It also suggests that it only applies to the extent the 
owners actually “control” the entity. While Justice Alito 
proclaims that separateness is “quite beside the point,” this 
passage above shows the opposite. Ignoring separateness was 
entirely the point. The Hobby Lobby decision depends upon a 
particular view of corporate personality—as an association of 
individual owners—to find justification. Looking-through to 
owners is more easily accomplished with family-owned and 
operated businesses, and is perhaps what the court means with the 
descriptor “closely held.”69 
Justice Alito’s opinion also supports the need for the 
aforementioned second and third conditions—that the owners 
shared (or agreed) to share the same religious beliefs, and that 
they had the authority and power to operate the corporation 
according to those beliefs. For example, the Court mentions that 
the owners of each corporation agreed to commit the entity to 
fulfill their own religious objectives. Each member of the Green 
family had “signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance 
with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family assets to 
support Christian ministries.”70 And, the Court noted that the 
Hahn family provided evidence of the Conestoga’s board-
adopted statement of the Hahn family belief that “human life 
begins at conception.”71 
This evidence that being a “person” under RFRA turned also 
on conditions two (owners sharing or agreeing to share the same 
religious beliefs) and three (owners operating the corporation in 
accordance with those beliefs) is seen where the Court suggests 
that not all corporations will be considered persons under RFRA. 
Dismissing HHS’s concern that publicly traded firms like IBM or 
General Electric could claim to have sincere beliefs, Justice Alito 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69. The Court suggests that drawing a line between closely held and other 
corporations for corporate free-exercise rights purposes is not a proper method. See. note 
8 supra. As such, we need to look at the attributes of the three corporate litigants, not 
merely the fact that they are closely held, to determine which types of corporations could 
be persons under RFRA and which could not. Not all closely-held corporations would pass 
the test and some that are not closely held could. 
 70. 134 S. Ct. at 2766. 
 71. Id. at 2764. 
IS HOBBY LOBBY A TOOL_FINAL DRAFT III (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2015 10:56 AM 
420 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:403 
 
responds that, “it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants 
to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims . . . numerous 
practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring.”72 
He offers the following reasoning, “[T]he idea that unrelated 
shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set 
of stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the 
same religious beliefs seems improbable.” The Court also notes 
that “we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s 
applicability to such companies. The companies in the cases 
before us are closely held corporations, each owned and 
controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed 
the sincerity of their religious beliefs.” This provides additional 
evidence that at the very least, ownership and control by a limited 
number of identifiable human beings is essential toward claiming 
personhood under RFRA. 
B. COMMENT LETTERS TO HHS 
Columbia Law School professor Katherine Franke and 
research fellow Kara Loewentheil organized a comment letter to 
HHS.73 The letter, which was signed by more than forty additional 
law professors, sought to provide a “thorough, practical and clear 
set of guidelines for for-profit entities wishing to seek an 
accommodation that is consistent with state corporate law 
principles and the Hobby Lobby ruling in both spirit and form.”74 
The letter distilled the key features of the closely-held business 
corporations that prevailed in the case. It was careful to note that 
the Court was not likely being exact in its use of the “closely-held” 
descriptor, but instead meant to evoke “a perception of intimacy 
of ownership rather than a reliance on a formalistic statutory form 
in state law.”75 Under the umbrella of “identity of interests” 
between the three corporations and their owners, the Franke 
letter highlighted the following attributes of all three respondent 
corporations: 
(1) they were entirely family-owned, (2) they consisted of a 
small number of shareholders, (3) the shareholders and the 
board of directors were co-extensive, (4) the 
family/shareholders/directors were unanimous in their 
religious convictions, (5) the family/shareholders/directors 
 
 72.  134 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 73. Law Professors’ Comment Letter on Definition, supra note 23 (This author is a 
signatory to the comment letter). 
 74.  Id. at 11. 
 75.  Id. at 3 
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were unanimous in wishing to seek an exemption from the 
contraceptive coverage requirement, and (6) the companies 
had long held themselves out to employees, customers, and the 
public as companies operating under religious principles that 
constrained their business behavior in accordance with the 
religious beliefs of equity holders/owners, thereby providing 
concrete evidence of their religious commitments.76 
Accordingly, the Franke letter recommended that HHS “limit any 
accommodation for for-profit entities only to those companies 
that meet each of these criteria, including being family-owned; the 
close ties between family members who share a religious faith and 
operate a religiously-influenced business are the best assurance of 
the close nexus on which corporate religious rights depend.” 
However, the letter also offered an alternative to limiting the 
eligibility for an accommodation to just family-owned businesses. 
It suggested the HHS might instead limit the accommodation to 
entities: 
(1) with a limited number of equity holders/owners, (2) that 
demonstrate religious commitment, and (3) submit evidence of 
unanimous consent of equity holders to seek an 
accommodation on an annual basis.77 
These three requirements parallel the three conditions upon 
which the decision arguably depended. They acknowledge a 
corporate ownership, governance and operational structure that 
gives the owners full knowledge and control over the religious 
identity and commitment of the corporation. 
Six professors at the University of California, Berkeley 
School of Law submitted a comment letter78 recommending how 
HHS could determine what for-profit entities should be able to 
claim exemptions from the ACA contraceptive mandate. The 
Berkeley letter asserted that Hobby Lobby “held that the nexus 
of identity between several closely-held, for-profit corporations 
and their shareholders holding ‘a sincere religious belief that life 
begins at conception’ was sufficiently close to justify granting such 
corporations an exemption” from the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate under RFRA. The letter proposed that the exemption 
 
 76.  Id. at 2. 
 77.  Id. at 2–3. 
 78. Robert P. Bartlett III, Richard M. Buxbaum, Stavros Gadinis, Justin McCrary, 
Steven Davidoff Solomon, & Eric L. Talley, Comment on the Definition of “Eligible 
Organization” for Purposes of Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the 
Affordable Care Act, Oct. 8, 2014 [hereinafter Berkeley Letter on Definition], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2507305. 
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be available only if a corporation and its shareholders certify that 
they “have a unity in identity and interests, and therefore the 
corporation should be viewed as the shareholders’ alter ego.”79 
Accordingly such entities could be vulnerable to veil piercing80 
whereby the shareholders could be personally liable for the debts 
of the corporation, as one example.  
The letter suggested that  shareholders would need to affirm 
that “(1) the corporate entity has an expressed religious identity 
or principle, (2) this principle should be recognized because the 
corporate entity is the alter ego of the shareholders with 
indistinguishable interests and commitments, and (3) the 
assertion of this principle does not conflict with the corporation’s 
governing documents or state law.”81 This approach also aligns 
with the three conditions (discussed above) upon which the 
decision in Hobby Lobby was arguably based. 
Another letter entitled, “Comments on the HHS’ Flawed 
Post-Hobby Lobby Rules,” submitted by seven law professors,82 
differs substantially from the other two. The authors contend that 
because under state corporate law the board of directors direct 
the business of the corporation, the shareholders should have 
little influence over a corporation’s religious identity.  It would be 
the directors, not the shareholders, who should decide whether a 
corporation would or would not “exercise religion.” 
These commentators recommend that HHS create a safe 
harbor under which an eligible organization would be “any 
corporation that is not a publicly reporting company under 
federal securities laws, the board of directors of which has 
 
 79.  Id. at 2. 
 80. Veil-piercing is a court-made exception to one of the central tenets of state 
corporate law, of limited personal liability for shareholders. For example, § 6.22(b) of the 
Model Business Corporation Act provides that “a shareholder of a corporation is not 
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become 
personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct;” also see ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS 
PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 157 (2013) (“With respect to large corporations 
with many public shareholders, the business entity is pierced to find individual equity 
owners liable very rarely, if ever.”). 
 81.  Berkeley Letter on Definition at 6 -7. 
 82. Lyman Johnson, David Millon, Stephen Bainbridge, Ronald J. Colombo, Brett 
McDonnell, Alan J. Meese, & Nathan B., Oman, Comment on the Definition of “Eligible 
Organization” for Purposes of Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the 
Affordable Care Act, Oct. 20, 2014 (also titled, Comments on the HHS’ Flawed Post-
Hobby Lobby Rules) [hereinafter Flawed Rules Letter], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512860. 
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determined will exercise religion in its business affairs.”.83 The 
safe harbor approach would also mean that other firms (including 
reporting companies) could still seek to gain eligibility for the 
exemption.  
Though the Court opined that “protecting the free-exercise 
rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel 
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control 
those companies,” these commentators saw limited to no direct 
input available to shareholders. Dissenting shareholders could 
“remove directors at the annual election of directors or at a 
special meeting held for that purpose.” Yet, removing members 
of the board of directors at large publicly held corporations is 
extremely difficult. Generally candidates for the board are 
nominated84 by a committee of the board and typically run 
uncontested.85 With plurality voting, a director need only receive 
one vote to get elected and even where majority voting is in place, 
if an incumbent nominee does not receive a majority, he or she is 
still not required to step down. 
The seven commentators also stated that “Absent an unusual 
charter or by-law provision, directors are the key decision-makers 
in corporations and neither they nor shareholders (where they do 
get to vote) must act with unanimity.” They explained Justice 
Alito’s repeated use of language such as “if owners agree” to 
mean at the very most a “simple majority vote.”86 
Considering together the majority opinion and the comment 
letters, we can observe that the Court indeed meant to restrict – 
based upon ownership, control, and religious commitment – the 
types of corporations that could be considered persons under 
RFRA and thus be eligible for an exemption from the 
contraceptive mandate. Thus a sound standard would require that 
business corporations can only be considered persons under 
 
 83. If a corporation met the conditions of the safe harbor, such as having no more 
than 2,000 shareholders (which could be institutional investors) it would be eligible for the 
exemption. 
 84. See LINDA O. SMIDDY & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 352 (7th ed. 2010) 
(“Historically, as a matter of general practice, a corporation’s incumbent board nominates 
directors for elections and presents its nominations in annual proxy statements produced 
at the corporation’s expense.”). 
 85. See Paul E. Fischer et al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence 
from Uncontested Director Elections 1 (Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928843 (“Every year the vast majority of publicly traded firms’ 
shareholders vote to approve members of the board of directors in uncontested elections 
(i.e., elections not involving proxy fights or vote-no campaigns).”). 
 86.  Flawed Rules Letter at 9. 
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RFRA if (1) the court looks-through the entity to see human 
owners whose free exercise rights are to be protected and who are 
intimately linked to the identity, ownership and control of the 
entity; (2) such owners share or agreed to share the same sincere 
religious beliefs as evidenced by consent of at least a majority (and 
possible all owners); and (3) owners openly operating the 
corporation in accordance with those beliefs.87 
III. USING A HOBBY LOBBY TOOL TO CURTAIL 
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING RIGHTS 
This section contemplates whether a form of Hobby Lobby 
Tool used for statutory free-exercise rights could apply in a 
constitutional rights context. As the Court has not yet found that 
corporations have free-exercise rights under the First 
Amendment, we must search for another example. A Supreme 
Court decision in which corporate constitutional rights were 
recognized based upon looking-through the entity to the owners 
would function well for this purpose. Citizens United is such a 
case. This is a good choice as it has quite a bit in common with 
Hobby Lobby.88 
A. CITIZENS UNITED  
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the 
First Amendment rights of corporations to engage in political 
spending activities. The Court’s reasoning included an 
assumption similar to the thinking in Hobby Lobby—that a 
corporation was an association of individual owners who should 
each not lose their rights simply because they joined together in 
corporate form to exercise them. As such, corporations deserved 
the same political “speech”89 rights under the First Amendment 
as real people. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was clear on 
this point and rejected the notion that the decision depended 
upon treating the corporation itself as a person. As Boston 
 
 87. Compare similarities and differences of these three conditions to Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of 
incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235 (2013). 
 88. Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Contraceptive Cases 65 S. CAR. L. REV. 1, at 36 (2013) (“Hence, Hobby Lobby 
is more akin to Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court 
recognized corporate speech rights as being personal to the speaker, but allowing a 
corporation to assert them because a corporation can speak.”). 
 89. Without endorsing the notion that spending money on politics equates with 
speech, this Article simply acknowledges that the Court has made this connection 
beginning with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (“virtually every means of 
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money”). 
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College Law School Professor Kent Greenfield recently 
reaffirmed, “The court did not . . . say that Citizens United, the 
corporate entity, had rights that were violated. What it said was 
that Citizens United was an association of citizens, and in 
constraining that organization’s ability to . . . to release its movie, 
it was violating the rights of its members.”90 
The Court in Citizens United assumed that a corporation 
does express the voice of empowered shareholders who could 
monitor and object to political spending decisions that depart 
from their interests. The Court expected that disclosure of 
corporate political spending would be prompt and complete.91 
With these assumptions in mind, the Court found unconstitutional 
legislation that had prohibited the use of unlimited corporate 
treasury funds to influence elections. 
The Court left open the question of which individuals 
associated with the corporation would have the power to decide 
how and when to engage in political spending. Recognizing the 
possibility that corporate managers might spend in ways that were 
misaligned with shareholders’ interest, Justice Kennedy suggested 
that any abuses could be corrected through “the procedures of 
corporate democracy.”92 Congress, state legislatures, and the 
SEC, for example, would have a role in enhancing such 
procedures to cure disclosure shortages and to help enhance how 
shareholders could better exercise their rights through their 
corporation. 
The Court also quite clearly created an opening for further 
disclosure of corporate political spending. While only five justices 
signed on to most of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, eight joined part 
IV which held that mandating further disclosure of corporate 
political spending would be permissible under the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 90. Should McDonald’s & Monsanto Have the Same Rights as People? A Debate on 
Corporate Personhood, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Mar. 13, 2015), transcript and video available 
at http://www.democracynow.org/2015/3/13/should_mcdonalds_monsanto_have_the_
same. 
 91. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[w]ith the advent of the 
Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the 
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their 
positions and supporters.”Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370. 
 92.  130 S. Ct. at 911. 
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B. APPLYING A HOBBY LOBBY TOOL TO LIMIT 
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING  
This next subsection considers whether the three putative 
Hobby Lobby pre-conditions to finding corporate statutory free-
exercise rights could apply to corporate constitutional rights. In 
particular it examines whether a Hobby Lobby Tool could be 
adapted to apply to corporate First Amendment political 
spending rights that were recognized in Citizens United. This 
inquiry has practical implications. Just as HHS is working to 
establish criteria to divide those business corporations that may 
gain a religious exemption to the ACA’s contraceptive mandate 
and those that may not, a legislator might wish to craft a bill that 
draws a line between business corporations that may engage in 
unlimited political spending and those that may not.  
This is an appropriate analogy given that both personhood 
rights under RFRA and corporate political spending rights under 
the First Amendment are look-through rights. They appear to 
derive from the owners that associate in the corporate form, and 
not from the entity itself or from other stakeholders. Moreover, 
to the extent that such a tool would encourage disclosure and 
shareholder voting rights, it would align well with the Court’s 
invitation to enact disclosure requirements. It would also reflect 
the Court’s recognition that shareholders’ interests in meaningful 
“procedures of corporate” democracy that would help check 
managerial abuses,  
However, directly applying a Hobby Lobby Tool used for 
purposes of free-exercise rights to political spending rights is 
slightly awkward. We would need to adapt the attributes of look-
through, consent and disclosure to fit the corporate political 
spending context. The elements of this adapted tool could include 
(1) look-through to identify human owners that are coextensive 
with the corporation; (2) notice and consent of owners to engage 
in particular political spending (on a majority, supermajority, or 
unanimous basis); and (3) public disclosure of the spending. A 
new statute that made these elements preconditions to receiving 
an exemption from a general prohibition on corporate political 
spending could be viewed as appropriate “procedures of 
corporate democracy” designed to mitigate the agency problem 
that arises from the separation of ownership from control. And, it 
would align well with the three conditions set out in Hobby 
Lobby. 
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Whether an adaptable Hobby Lobby Tool like this one could 
be used to curtail corporate political speech rights might depend 
upon whether a future Court majority would view the Hobby 
Lobby decision as a shift from or clarification of Citizens United. 
It may be too bold quite yet to expect the Court to uphold a 
statute enacted that restored verbatim the pre-Citizen’s 
restrictions on corporate political spending found in BCRA 
simply because it provided carve-outs. However, at some point, a 
Court could take this approach, quite rationally. 
One way to nearly meet the three conditions of the Hobby 
Lobby Tool would be to restrict corporate political spending to 
those entities that on an annual basis provide advance notice and 
obtain the unanimous vote of shareholders (including 
institutional shareholders) to support political spending activities. 
Short of unanimous support, supermajority approval by 
shareholders (by voting shares) plus oversight by independent 
directors, as suggested by corporate law scholars Lucian Bebchuk 
and Robert Jackson,93 would be advisable. Another method might 
be to only allow political spending by those corporations that have 
charters that (or that are incorporated in states that) require the 
consent of the human beings who own shares. Such a method 
might require unanimous consent, or if not could be a 
supermajority or majority vote on a per capita or per share basis. 
There are a variety of related approaches, some of which are 
being attempted by policymakers. For example, in early 2015, 
Maryland state senator, Jamie Raskin introduced a bill94 that if 
enacted would require Maryland corporations to disclose on their 
websites political expenditures95 within 48 hours. It would also 
require corporations to obtain annual shareholder consent (by a 
 
 93. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate 
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84–85, 97–107 (2010) 
(suggesting that “lawmakers should develop special rules to govern who may make 
political speech decisions on behalf of corporations” and that because Citizens United 
expanded “the scope of constitutionally protected corporate political speech,” “the need 
for such rules [is] all the more pressing.” Such proposals would include the mandatory 
disclosure of political expenditures subject to a supermajority of shareholders voting to 
approve the spending and overseen by independent directors). 
 94. S.B. 153, 2015 S., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015), available at http://mgaleg.mary
land.gov/2015RS/bills/sb/sb0153f.pdf; Lasio Boyd, Jamie Raskin’s Challenge to ‘Citizens 
United’, CTR. MD. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.centermaryland.org/index.php
?option=com_easyblog&view=entry&id=1191. 
 95. The term “political expenditure” is defined to mean “a contribution, gift, 
transfer, disbursement, or promise of money or a thing of value to promote or assist in the 
promotion of the success or defeat of a candidate, political party, or question in any state 
or federal election.” S.B. 153, 2015 S., 435th Sess. (Md. 2015). 
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majority of votes entitled to be cast) of the political expenditure 
budget96 as well as consent to where the money or property is 
directed, such as specific candidates, causes, parties, and PACs. 
Senator Raskin has suggested that if certain institutional investors 
are not legally permitted to cast their votes approving the 
direction of political expenditures, this may result in the failure to 
gain a majority approval and thus prohibit the campaign-related 
spending.97 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Hobby Lobby decision arguably provides tools to curtail 
certain corporate constitutional rights. The rights that could be 
subject to restriction are those that the Court has recognized as 
deriving from looking through the entity to the owners. This 
would include the First Amendment corporate political spending 
rights recognized in Citizens United. A statute should be upheld 
that limits corporate political spending to those entities where 
there is an identity of interest between the human owners and the 
corporation, where there is majority shareholder consent to the 
specific spending, and where there is public disclosure of such 
spending.  
Even if a future Court majority might be willing to rely on a 
Hobby Lobby Tool to curtail corporate political spending or other 
corporate constitutional rights, this may be an undesirable 
response to a bigger problem. Treating shareholders as “owners” 
and conflating owners with the corporation is not fully supported 
as a matter of law or policy.98 Even with shareholder approval of 
political spending (or to the exercise of other First Amendment 
or statutory personhood rights), we should be concerned that the 
 
 96. See S.B. 153, 2015 S., 435 Sess. (Md. 2015). 
 97. Jamie B. Raskin, A Shareholder Solution to ‘Citizens United’, WASH. POST. (Oct. 
3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-shareholder-solution-to-citizens-
united/2014/10/03/5e07c3ee-48be-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html (“I am introducing 
legislation . . . that will require managers of Maryland-registered corporations who wish to 
engage in political spending for their shareholders to post all political expenditures on 
company Web sites within 48 hours and confirm that any political spending fairly reflects 
the explicit preference of shareholders owning a majority interest in the company. Further, 
if no ‘majority will’ of the shareholders can form to spend money for political candidates—
because most shares are owned by institutions forbidden to participate in partisan 
campaigns—then the corporation will be prohibited from using its resources on political 
campaigns.”). 
 98. STOUT, supra note 26  at 93; see also Pollman, supra note  6 (questions persist as 
to “whether the corporation has a separate existence, reified or real, from the persons 
connected with it and whether the emphasis in understanding the nature of the corporation 
should be on the separate legal entity or on the aggregate of individuals involved.”). 
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First Amendment could be used to undermine or evade 
regulation.99 Importantly, there are more direct critiques of 
Citizens United.100 Such approaches could be used restore 
campaign finance limits or gain support for public funding of 
elections. Finally, relying on a Hobby Lobby Tool might result in 
the expansion instead of the contraction of corporate 
constitutional rights. Perhaps rights previously denied to 
corporations due to their being personal in nature could now be 
expanded with look-through treatment. With those objections in 
mind, on balance, however, it seems wise to explore legislation 
that prohibits certain corporate political spending with 
exemptions for those corporations that meet the three-part test 
of: (1) look-through to identify owners that are coextensive with 
the corporation; (2) notice and consent of shareholders (on at 
least a majority basis) to engage in particular political spending; 
and (3) public disclosure of the spending. 
 
 99. Piety, supra note 27, at 366 (“[T]here is almost no case that can’t, with creative 
lawyering, be turned into a First Amendment case and many of these cases depend upon 
some version of the equal protection argument.”) 
 100. David A. Westbrook, If Not a Commercial Republic? Political Economy in the 
United States after Citizens United, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 35, 36 (2011) (“What makes 
Citizens United disturbing is that the case signals a rupture in our constitutional tradition”); 
Coates, supra note 29, at 234 (“[C]ommercial and corporate speech—in the most 
important activities of every business, including contract formation, retention and 
regulation of agents, and engaging in risk-taking activities—was pervasively regulated and 
structured by law long before the modern, expansive version of the First Amendment, 
which . . . was invented only recently.”); TEACHOUT, supra note 31. 
